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Abstract 
 
Phishing is a form of online identity theft, which 
attempts to appropriate confidential and sensitive 
information such as usernames and passwords from 
its victims. To facilitate cyberspace as a secure 
environment, phishing education needs to be made 
accessible to home computer users and mobile 
games enable embedded learning in a natural 
environment. Previously, we have introduced a 
mobile game design that aimed to enhance 
avoidance motivation and behavior to protect 
against phishing threats. This paper focuses on a 
design that develops the conceptual knowledge that 
is necessary to combat phishing threats, home 
computer teaching users about phishing emails and 
web addresses. The prototype game design is 
presented on Google App Inventor Emulator. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Security exploits can include IT threats such as 
viruses, malicious software (malware), unsolicited e-
mail (spam), and monitoring software (spyware). 
Phishing, however, is a form of semantic attack [1, 
8] that leverages human vulnerabilities, rather than 
exploiting technical pitfalls. Attackers will attempt to 
trick Internet users into following malformed URLs 
(Uniform Resource Locators) that mimic legitimate 
versions as closely as possible. These will typically 
lead to fraudulent websites that share the same look-
and-feel as the real version. Users may then 
unintentionally provide private information such as 
usernames, passwords or bank details to a third 
party.  
This research comprehends the need of which the 
human aspect of security can be influenced to avoid 
malicious IT threats in the context of home computer 
use. These users are susceptible to phishing threats 
due to the rapid growth of Internet technology [9]. It 
is so ubiquitous today that it provides the baseline for 
modern living, enabling ordinary people to socialize, 
shop, and be entertained all through their home 
computers. As people’s reliance on the Internet 
grows, the possibility of hacking, attacking and other 
security breaches increases day by day [5]. 
Therefore, home computer users make a significant 
contribution in helping to make cyberspace a safer 
place for everyone and the message “security starts 
at home” should be spread to all home computer 
users [2].  
In the past, phishing attacks have been distributed 
through scam emails [10, 17]. For example, urging 
people to participate in a survey or verify their bank 
account information. Now it has become a persistent 
threat as people consume and distribute a significant 
amount of information through links in social media. 
This includes internet enabled services such as 
Facebook, Hi5, Skype, Twitter, Orkut, Google+, and 
even more professional social networking website 
such as LinkedIn. 
In addition, as organizations have become 
increasingly ‘virtual’ there has been a technological 
move from work to the domestic environment [7]. 
Employees have freedom to work at home or bring 
unfinished work home due to the pervasiveness of 
Internet technology. This increases the opportunity 
for home computer users to open a “back door” to 
vulnerable IT threats. These home computer users 
are unlikely to have a sufficient IT infrastructure or 
technology to protect themselves from malicious IT 
attacks, or may not have a proper standard or strict 
IT security policies in place. For example, most 
home computer users are not IT professionals and 
lack the necessary computer literacy to establish a 
secure home computing system. Home computer 
users also tend to display unsafe computer behavior 
that is particularly vulnerable to IT threats.  For 
example, browsing unsafe websites, downloading 
suspicious software, sharing passwords among 
family and peers, and using unprotected home 
wireless networks [5].  
As phishing attacks become increasingly 
sophisticated, it becomes more challenging to protect 
against them [3, 13] and without an appropriate level 
of security awareness, some home computer users 
are becoming vulnerable to these new threats [12, 
14]. A number of automated software tools have 
been developed to alert users of potentially 
fraudulent emails and websites [13]. Ye and Sean 
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[21] and Dhamija and Tygar [15] have developed a 
prototype called “trusted paths” for the Mozilla web 
browser that is designed to help users verify that 
their browser has made a secure connection to a 
trusted website. However, these systems are not 
totally reliable in detecting phishing attacks [19]. 
Previous research has revealed that the available 
anti-phishing tools such as Calling ID Toolbar, 
Cloudmark Anti-Fraud Toolbar, EarthLink Toolbar, 
Firefox 2, eBay Toolbar, and Netcraft Anti-Phishing 
Toolbar are insufficient to combat phishing threats 
[18]. Even the best toolbars miss over 20% of 
phishing websites [20]. On the one hand, software 
application designers and developers, with the help 
of security expertise, will continue to improve 
phishing and spam detection. Nonetheless, the 
human factor risk is high and people are the weakest 
link in information security [4]. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to mitigate human factor risks by 
educating users against phishing threats [16, 18]. 
In this paper, we present the design of a mobile 
game that aims to develop conceptual knowledge of 
phishing URLs. The most significant feature of 
mobile environment is mobility itself such as 
mobility of the user, mobility of the device, and 
mobility of the service [11, 22]. It enables users to be 
in contact while they are outside the reach of 
traditional communicational spaces. For example, a 
person can play a game on his mobile device while 
travelling on the bus or train. The reminder of this 
paper is organized as follows: section two discusses 
related work; section three describes the game 
prototype design we created on Google App Inventor 
Emulator; and the paper concludes in section four 
opening future work directions. 
 
2. Related work 
 
All Arachchilage and Cole [11, 12] designed a 
mobile game design prototype as an educational tool 
to teach home computer users to protect themselves 
against phishing attacks. Their research proposed a 
mobile game design for learning, based on a story, 
which simplifies and exaggerates real life situations. 
The research asked the following questions: The first 
question is how does the system developer identify 
which issues the game needs to address? Once the 
developer has identified the salient issues, they are 
faced with second question, what principles should 
guide the structure of this information. A theoretical 
model derived from Technology Threat Avoidance 
Theory (TTAT) was used to address those mobile 
game design issues and the mobile game design 
principles were used as a set of guidelines for 
structuring and presenting information in the mobile 
game design context [6, 11]. The objective of their 
anti-phishing mobile game design was to teach the 
user how to identify phishing URLs and emails, 
which is one of many ways to identify a phishing 
attack. The overall mobile game design was focused 
to enhance avoidance behavior through motivation of 
home computer users to thwart phishing threats. The 
prototype game design was presented on Google App 
Inventor Emulator. 
The proposed mobile game design was focused 
almost entirely on procedural knowledge. However, 
some conceptual knowledge about the parts of URL 
and email might help the user to distinguish phishing 
URLs and email messages from legitimate ones [19]. 
Therefore, this research attempts to address this issue 
in the mobile game design context. For example, 
when a user correctly identifies a phishing URL, they 
should be asked which portion of the URL indicates 
phishing, to determine whether or not they have 
understood the concept of a phishing URL. 
Alternatively, when a user is presented with a portion 
of a phishing email, addressing “Dear Valued 
Customer” this can also be used to determine 
whether or not they have understood the concept of 
phishing email. Therefore, this research attempts to 
extend Arachchilage and Cole’s [11, 12] mobile 
game design by addressing conceptual knowledge of 
phishing URLs and emails to thwart phishing 
attacks.  
 
3. Game prototype design 
 
To explore the viability of using a game to thwart 
phishing attacks based on conceptual knowledge, a 
prototype was implemented using Google App 
Inventor Emulator. We created a story addressing 
conceptual knowledge of phishing URLs and emails 
within a game design context. 
 
3.1 Story 
 
The game is based on a scenario of the character 
of a small fish and a big fish that both live in a big 
pond. The main character is the small fish, who 
wants to eat worms to become a big fish. Worms are 
randomly generated in the game design. The user 
role-plays as the small fish. However the small fish 
should be careful of phishers those who try to trick 
him with fake worms. This represents phishing 
attacks by developing threat perception. The other 
character is the small fish’s teacher, who is 
experienced fish in the pond. The proposed mobile 
game design prototype contains two sections: 
teaching the concept of phishing URLs and phishing 
emails. In the mobile game design, the user is 
presented a combination of phishing and legitimate 
URLs (in this case 15 URLs) and emails (in this case 
15 emails). Both URLs and emails are targeted to 
teach user conceptual knowledge of phishing attacks.  
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3.1.1 Concepts of phishing website addresses 
(URLs) 
  
 Each worm is associated with a URL, which 
appears as a dialog box. The small fish’s job is to eat 
all the real worms which are associated with URLs 
and avoid fake worms which are associated with fake 
URLs before the time is up (Fig. 1). This attempts to 
develop the severity and susceptibility of the 
phishing threat through the game design. If a 
phishing URL is correctly identified, then users are 
prompted to indicate which portion of the URL 
indicates phishing in order to determine whether or 
not they have understood the conceptual knowledge 
of the phishing URL (Fig. 2). At this time the users 
score will be doubled in order to encourage them to 
complete the game. Nevertheless, if the phishing 
URL is incorrectly identified, then users get real time 
feedback saying why their decision was wrong with 
an example such as “Legitimate websites usually do 
not have numbers at the beginning of their URLs. 
For example, 
http://181.57.97.116/.www.hsbc.co.uk”. Therefore, 
this attempts to teach conceptual knowledge of 
phishing URLs within the game design context. 
 
 If the worm associated with the URL is 
suspicious or if it is difficult to identify, the small 
fish can go to the ‘teacher’ and request help. The big 
fish would then provide some tips on how to 
recognize bad worms. For example, “website 
addresses associated with numbers in the front are 
generally scams,” or “a company name followed by a 
hyphen in a URL is generally a scam”. Whenever the 
small fish demands help from the teacher, the time 
left will be reduced by certain amount (in this case 
by 1 minute) as a payback for safeguard measure. 
This attempts to address the safeguard effectiveness 
and the cost needs to pay for the safeguard in the 
game design context. The consequences of the 
player’s actions are shown in Table 1. 
 
 Table 1. Scoring scheme and consequences of the 
player’s action.  
  
 Good worm  
(associate with 
legitimate URL) 
Bad worm  
(associate with 
phishing URL) 
Player 
eats 
Correct, gain 15 
points (each attempt  
= 1 point) 
False negative, 
(each attempt loses 
1 minute out of 10 
minutes) 
Player 
reject 
False positive, (each 
attempt loses 1 
minute out of 10 
minutes) 
Correct, gain 15 
points (each attempt  
= 1 point) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Main Menu of the game prototype design 
displayed on Google App Inventor Emulator. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Phishing URL dialog box: Learning 
conceptual knowledge of phishing URL. 
 
 
3.1.2 Teaching the concept of phishing emails 
 
Each worm is randomly generated with an email 
icon in the game design, so the small fish needs to 
eat the worm to open the email (Fig. 3 and Fig. 5). 
This task is done once the user clicks on the worm. 
At this point, a portion of an email will appear asking 
the user to identify whether it is legitimate or 
phishing email. This represents phishing attacks by 
developing threat perception. The reason for using a 
portion of an email, instead of an email, is to 
determine whether or not the user has understood the 
conceptual knowledge about phishing emails. The 
small fish’s job is to eat all the real worms by 
clicking the “ACCEPT” button while avoiding fake 
worms by clicking the “AVOID” button (Fig. 6). If 
the user falsely accepted a legitimate or phishing 
email, they are susceptible to a phishing attack. This 
causes to lose one life at each attempt in the game 
Teacher
http://181.5
7.97.116/.w
ww.hsbc.co
.uk 
Hook 
Worm 
Small  
fish 
Legitimate 
websites 
usually do not 
have numbers 
at the 
beginning of 
their URLs. 
For example, 
http://81.153.1
92.106/.www.
hsbc.co.uk
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design.  At this point, the game design emphasizes 
both the likelihood of phishing attack and severity 
caused by the attack. The different sections of an 
email help user to identify the legitimacy of email 
[9]. For example, phishing emails often contain 
generic salutation such as “Dear Valued Customer” 
or use of a trusted company logo. It could also be a 
statement urging immediate action or mimicking the 
email address (Fig.7). Each worm associated with a 
portion of an email may contain phishing email traps 
as well as legitimate ones. The phishing email traps 
covered in the game design include fake links or 
email addresses, generic salutations, statements 
urging immediate actions and much more. 
 
If the portion of an email is suspicious and if it is 
difficult to identify, the small fish can go to ‘his’ 
teacher and demand help. The teacher could help him 
by giving some tips on how to identify phishing 
emails. For example, “phishing emails often contain 
a generic salutation” or “emails associated with 
urgent requests are generally phishing emails”. 
Whenever the small fish demands help from the 
teacher, the time left will be reduced by certain 
amount (in this case by 1 minute) as a payback for 
safeguard measure. This attempts to address the 
safeguard effectiveness and the cost needs to pay for 
the safeguard in the game design. The small fish’s 
teacher may also help the player throughout the 
game until it is completed by providing some tips 
(Fig. 3 and Fig. 4). This can enhance the learnability 
of the game itself for the user. 
The proposed game design is presented in 
different levels such as beginner, intermediate and 
advance. When the user moves from the beginner to 
advanced level, the complexity of the combination of 
URLs and emails is dramatically increased while 
considerably decreasing the time period to complete 
the game. Therefore, self-efficacy of preventing from 
phishing attacks will be addressed in the game 
design. Furthermore, a reference guide in the game 
design provides useful information on where the user 
can learn more about phishing attacks. The reference 
guide is linked to the education section of the Anti-
Phishing Work Group website (APWG - 
http://education.apwg.org/). The overall game design 
is used to teach conceptual knowledge of phishing 
emails and URLs for home computer users to thwart 
phishing threats. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The small fish’s teacher provides tips: 
Click on the worm to “OPEN” the email. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The small fish’s teacher provides tips: If 
you think this is a portion of a phishing email, Click 
“AVOID”. However, if you think this is a portion of 
a legitimate email, Click “ACCEPT”. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The small fish is waiting for open the 
email. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Learning the concepts of phishing emails 
 
“AVOID
” button 
Hook 
Small  
fish Teacher 
If you think this is 
a portion of a 
phishing email, 
click “AVOID” 
However, if you 
think this is a 
portion of a 
legitimate email, 
click “ACCEPT” 
“ACCEPT” 
button 
Email 
icon 
Hook 
Small  
fish Teacher 
Click on the 
worm to 
“OPEN” the 
email 
Worm 
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Figure 7. Different sections of a phishing email: 
mimicked email address, salutation, logo, urging 
message. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Author This research focused on designing a 
mobile game as an educational tool for home 
computer users to develop the conceptual knowledge 
behind phishing attacks. Previous research resulted 
in a mobile game to educate home computer users 
about phishing attacks, but it was aimed almost 
entirely on procedural knowledge. Conceptual 
knowledge helps users avoid phishing attacks more 
robustly, due to the necessity to teach users to 
identify phishing concepts in order to avoid evolving 
threats on new platforms, such as social media. We 
believe that by providing this type of education and 
training for home computer users, it could make a 
considerable contribution to enabling cyberspace to 
be a more secure environment. 
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